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Identity, Significance, Sensation or Justice?
Different Motives which Attract to Radical Ideas
Julia Reiter
University of Vienna, Austria
Bertjan Doosje
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
People can be attracted to radical ideas for different reasons. In the present study, we propose four types of
people attracted to such ideas due to different motives: the identity seeker, the significance seeker, the sensation
seeker, and the justice seeker. To investigate this model, we conducted five narrative interviews with individuals
who had disengaged during the early stages of radicalization (Study 1) and seven semi-structured expert inter -
views with staff of German deradicalization programmes (Study 2). Data were analyzed using a coding reliability
approach to thematic analyses. The proposed typology was not supported in full, but the individual motivations
making up the types were all reflected in the data, the most important being the need to belong, personal uncer -
tainty, and need for status. This study’s key finding is that rather than generalizing types of radicalization or
types of ideology, it is productive to analyze individuals on the basis of their personal combination of psycholo-
gical needs and the saliency thereof. We relate this to past research and discuss practical implications.
Keywords:  radical ideas, radicalization, motivations for radicalization, qualitative data, interviews
Acknowledgement: A large set of variables was measured in this study. While the present article focuses on per -
sonal motives, risk factors and trigger factors of radicalization and deradicalization are described in detail in Re-
iter, Doosje and Feddes (2021). Consequently, parts of the methods section are very similar. We extend our deep-
est gratitude to Nadine Jukschat and her colleagues at the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony
(KfN e.V.) for conducting the interviews analyzed in Study 1 and providing us with the transcripts. 
All  models of the radicalization process currently in
use recognize some set of factors – such as risk fac-
tors and trigger factors – that advance and shape the
course  of  radicalization.  Individual  susceptibility  to
these factors varies; we argue that this susceptibility
is modulated by personal motivational tendencies. In-
dividual  motives  in  the  radicalization  process  have
been discussed by various authors, but a comprehen-
sive motivational typology had not been put forth un-
til Macdougall et al. presented theirs in 2018. We in-
cluded this motivational typology, which the authors
derived from a review of the current literature, in our
own comprehensive model,  which combines motives
and risk and trigger factors. This permitted us to con-
duct the first empirical exploration of such a compre-
hensive motivational typology, using a set of qualita-
tive  data  from two small-scale interview studies.  In
Study 1, we analyze interviews conducted with sub-
jects who had displayed a certain vulnerability to and
exploration of radical ideologies. In Study 2, we exam-
ine data gathered in semi-structured interviews with
seven experts on the (de-)radicalization process. Thus,
the  present  article  extends  the  current  state  of  re-
search in several ways: Firstly, our model is the first to
systematically  unify  motivational  types,  risk  factors
and trigger factors into one comprehensive model, al-
lowing us to make some cautious observations about
how they may exert combined effects.  Secondly, we
applied the same theoretical model to datasets from
different groups in Study 1 and Study 2,  which en-
ables us to add to the state of research by comparing
primary-  and  secondary-source  perspectives  on  the
radicalization process. This information is valuable for
interpreting the results of previous research using sec-
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ondary-source data, such as expert interviews. Finally,
we conduct the first field exploration of the four moti-
vational  types  developed  experimentally  by  Mac-
dougall et al. (2018).
1 Radicalization: Term and Process 
Our analyses of the psychological needs and motives
associated  with  radicalization  are  part  of  a  larger
study (Reiter 2018; Reiter, Doosje and Feddes 2021) in
which we examined a four-plus-one stage model  of
(de-)radicalization,  which  conceptualizes  radicaliza-
tion as the process of accepting violence as a justified
means of achieving certain political goals (Doosje et
al.  2016).  The phases  of  radicalization,  derived from
current  literature  (mainly  drawing  on  Doosje  et  al.
2016  and  Feddes,  Nickolson,  and  Doosje  2017)  and
analyses  of  our  own  data,  are:  vulnerability,  explo-
ration,  membership,  and  action.  Deradicalization  or
disengagement  (the  former  referring  to  beliefs  and
attitudes, while the latter refers to behaviour;  Altier,
Thoroughgood,  and  Horgan  2014;  Dechesne  2011;
Della Porta and LaFree 2012; Demant et al. 2008; Veld-
huis 2012) can occur during any of these phases, im-
plying that the process is not necessarily linear. The
development  of  a  radical  belief  system  has  been
linked to the occurrence of violence: in two large-scale
surveys,  Doosje  and  colleagues  (Doosje  et  al.  2012;
Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos 2013) successfully
used the components of a radical belief system to pre-
dict both attitudes towards violence by other in-group
members and a person’s own violent intentions.
2 Motivational Typology
Different  motivational  structures  –  that  is,  different
psychological needs – can modulate responses to radi-
calizing stimuli, such that even people with the same
vulnerability  factors  respond  to  them  differently
(Cottee and Hayward 2011; Demant et al. 2008; Mac-
dougall  et al.  2018).  These needs are relatively fixed
predispositions to certain behaviours, perceptions, re-
actions, and motivational responses to stimuli. Exist-
ing typologies frequently highlight one aspect at the
expense  of  others,  resulting  in  overly  simplistic  or
one-sided  models.  By  contrast,  Macdougall  et  al.
(2018) present a comprehensive model unifying differ-
ent  strands of  the existing literature,  which encom-
passes four types: identity seeker, significance seeker,
sensation  seeker,  and  justice  seeker.  Each  of  these
types  consists  of  discrete  psychological  constructs,
which  Macdougall  et  al.  measured  using  question-
naires and which we adapt to be applicable to qualita-
tive data. Since Macdougall et al. were able to demon-
strate with experimental data that the types they syn-
thesized based on previous literature on the subject
are all, to varying degrees, relevant to the radicaliza-
tion process, we base our studies on their model.
The  identity  seeker  type encompasses  motivations
concerning the person and their role  in society:  the
need to know who they are, where and with whom
they belong. It is described by Bjørgo (2011), Choud-
hury  (2007),  Hogg (2014),  King  and Taylor  (2011)  –
who also relate identity-related issues to experiences
of discrimination – and Venhaus (2010), amongst oth-
ers.  A strong motivation of this kind causes height-
ened susceptibility to peer pressure and, as such, is
the mark of a  typical  follower.  Identity  motives are
not only the most prevalent in the theoretical litera-
ture  (though  perhaps  on  par  with  the  significance
seeker type); there is also evidence that such persons
make up the largest group empirically: Venhaus (2010)
defines four seeker types – identity, revenge, status,
and thrill – and, in an analysis of N = 2,032 legal case
files and interviews with former Al Qaeda recruits and
other Islamicized religious extremists (an alternative
we suggest to the term “Islamist” which is problem-
atic, as it seems to suggest that the religious extrem-
ism is  something inherent  to Islam),  concludes that
identity seekers are the largest group (40 percent). We
operationalize the identity seeking type as high levels
of need to belong and personal uncertainty (entailing
the need for uncertainty avoidance). A person with a
strong need to belong is highly motivated to belong to
a social  group, leading to behaviours aimed at inte-
grating  into  a  group and avoiding  isolation.  People
with a strong need to belong are highly sensitive to
social exclusion and emotionally dependent on being
accepted  by  others.  Personal  uncertainty  (dubbed
emotional uncertainty by Macdougall et al. 2018, who
used an emotional measure not applied in our inter-
views)  describes feelings of uncertainty and insecu-
rity  concerning aspects  of  one’s  life  and worldview,
leading  the  person  to  seek  out  clear  rules,  strong
ijcv.org
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structures  and  black-and-white  ideologies  because
they reduce uncertainty and increase security. People
with high personal uncertainty tend to be rigid, anx-
ious when confronted with sudden changes, and cope
poorly with uncertain situations.
The significance seeker type describes anyone with a
strong desire for  significance,  be it  personal  signifi-
cance – a desire for high personal status – or existen-
tial  significance – a desire for  definitive answers to
life’s existential questions. This type appears in most
typologies,  albeit  under different names.  Cottee and
Hayward  (2011)  identify  three  “existential  motiva-
tions”:  the desire for excitement,  the desire for ulti-
mate meaning and the desire for glory, the latter two
of which are identical to the components of signifi-
cance seeking. Dugas and Kruglanski (2014) propose
the “Quest for Significance Model”, in which a desire
for personal significance and glory is the central driv-
ing force behind radicalization. This desire to enhance
status and self-image (Doosje et al. 2016; Dugas and
Kruglanski 2014; Venhaus 2010; Webber and Kruglan-
ski 2018) differs from the need for transcendent exis-
tential  meaning (Kruglanski et al.  2009).  The signifi-
cance seeking type is thus a compound of the con-
structs need for existential meaning and need for sta-
tus, which motivate an attraction to ideological sys-
tems and figures that offer a clear worldview and a set
of rules and behaviours aimed at enhancing social sta-
tus, public image and self-worth stemming from the
opinions of others.
A type which is less common in the literature is the
sensation seeker. It is marked by a need for excitement
(Bakker and De Leede 2015; Bjørgo 2011; Cottee and
Hayward 2011; Venhaus 2010) and a need for romance
(Bakker and De Leede 2015; Gellin 2015; Hoyle, Brad-
ford, and Frenett 2015). Need for excitement describes
classic sensation seeking, that is, seeking out risky be-
haviours  that  produce  a  characteristic  adrenaline
rush, sometimes including dangerous and illegal activ-
ities,  while  need for  romance describes  a  desire for
short-term romantic entanglement, characterized not
by  serious  emotional  connection  but  by  the  excite-
ment  of  newness  and potential  promiscuity.  This  is
distinct  from the  desire  for  serious  long-term emo-
tional  connection to a  romantic  partner,  which is  a
possible iteration of the need to belong. 
Finally, the  justice seeker type is based on the con-
cept of justice seeking as a general factor of radical-
ization,  as  described  by Borum (2003)  and van den
Bos (2018), for example. Inter-individual differences in
sensitivity to violations of fairness have been found in
various studies (Gollwitzer et al. 2009). Need for jus-
tice describes a heightened sensitivity to injustice as
well as a strong tendency to be motivated by the pur-
suit  of  justice,  to  react  strongly  and emotionally  to
unfair treatment, and to engage in behaviours aimed
at  meting  out  justice  (according  to  the  individual’s
own definition).  
We examined whether and to what extent the psy-
chological needs underlying this typology were repre-
sented in our qualitative data. Aside from substituting
personal  for  emotional  uncertainty,  as  described
above,  we  applied  the  motivational  model  of  Mac-
dougall et al. as described by its authors. We hypothe-
sized, on the basis of our literature analysis, that the
identity  and  significance  seeker  types  would  occur
more frequently than the other two types. 
3 Method
We conducted two qualitative studies: In Study 1, we
analyzed data collected from interviewees in the ini-
tial phases of our process model (vulnerability and ex-
ploration).  In  Study  2,  we  analyzed  data  collected
from expert interviews with staff employed in various
German  exit  programmes  (programmes  which  sup-
port members of radical groups who are willing to dis-
engage). Approval was granted by the ethics commit-
tee of the University of Göttingen. 
3.1 Study 1
3.1.1 Sample
Five anonymized interview transcripts were provided
for secondary analysis by the Criminological Research
Institute of Lower Saxony. These were narrative inter-
views conducted with young adults who self-identi-
fied as Muslim and had, over the course of their inter-
views, described some form of exploration of or con-
tact with radical groups. None of the interviewees de-
scribed serious involvement with such groups or crim-
inal  acts  related  to  ideology.  Participants  were  re-
cruited  via  Facebook  and  Instagram based  on  self-
identification as a devout Muslim. Profiles were set up
ijcv.org
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on both sites to advertise the study; persons wishing
to participate simply contacted these profiles. Narra-
tive interviews are a method (Schütze 1976) in which
interviewees  are  presented  with  a  general  narrative
prompt and then allowed to unfold their own narra-
tive,  choosing themselves  which topics  to  focus  on,
uninterrupted by the interviewer except for clarifica-
tions.  Our data set  was selected by the interviewer
from the total data corpus of twelve interviews, on the
basis that interviewees should have had some contact
with radical groups. This resulted in four female inter-
viewees and one male interviewee (see Table 1), which
is notable as males are often overrepresented in stud-
ies of and discourse around radicalization.
3.1.2 Interview
At the beginning of the interview, participants were
asked to talk about their religious development, what
had led to their self-identification as a devout Muslim,
and which influences they considered important for
this trajectory. The interviewees talked freely, without
interruption except for clarification or elaboration on
certain aspects, so as not to cut the narrative short or
divert the focus of the interview from that chosen by
the interviewee.
3.1.3 Analysis
Data were analyzed using a mixture of basic quantita-
tive and theoretically guided qualitative methods. The
qualitative analysis was guided by a coding-reliability
approach  to  thematic  analyses  (Braun  and  Clarke
2016).
Two interviews were chosen at random for an initial
reading and an initial coding system was developed
based on previously researched literature. These codes
were then applied to one of the initial interviews as
well as a newly selected third one. During this step,
the coding system was expanded inductively: Further
recurring topics identified as relevant to the research
questions  were  added  as  codes.  The  resulting  final
coding scheme was then applied to the entire data
set. After all data had been coded, the codes were col-
lated  into  meaningful  themes.  These  themes  were
then reviewed, defined and named (see Reiter, Doosje
and Feddes 2021 for details).
Coding  system. The  coding  system  included  the
seven  psychological  constructs  underlying  our  pro-
posed motivational typology (as described above) and
various  other  codes  which  are  not  pertinent  to the
present article (but see Reiter 2018; Reiter, Doosje and
Feddes 2021). The overall coding system (see Appen-
dix 1) was adapted in an iterative process; however,
the codes related to the proposed motivational typol-
ogy in the present  article  were  unaffected by these
adaptations. 
The  smallest  coding  unit  was  a  single  sentence.
However,  if  the  same  topic  was  expressed  in  more
than one  sentence  without  interruption  by  another
topic, the entire segment was marked with the corre-
sponding code once, rather than every sentence indi-
vidually. 
Reliability/inter-rater agreement. After all interviews
had been coded by Coder A (the first author), Coder B
received  coding  training  from  Coder  A  and  then
coded one interview. The training involved a compre-
ijcv.org
Table 1: Overview of participants in Study 1
Code Duration of 
Interview
Age Sex Nationality/Ethnicity Educational Background Relation to Islam
S1P1 120 min 21 f German citizen with Turk-
ish background
B.A. in Islamic Theology Muslim from birth
S1P2 111 min 21 f German without migration 
background
B.A. in Psychology Convert
S1P3 136 min 33 f German without migration 
background
Unemployed, no educa-
tion beyond high school
Convert
S1P4 146 min 21 m German citizen with Al-
gerian background
B.A. Social Work Muslim from birth
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hensive  instructional  document  and  an  additional
question-and-answer  session.  Basic  coding  rules  in-
cluded the possibility and sometimes necessity to ap-
ply multiple codes to the same coding unit, the expan-
sive application of codes (including the context if nec-
essary),  and  application  of  most  codes  in  both  the
positive and negative sense (to mark the presence or
explicit  absence  or  opposite  of  the  code).  The total
number  of  codes  used by Coder A was revealed to
Coder B as a guideline. 
As there were five interviews (10 hours 54 minutes
total), the interview chosen for double-coding using a
random number generator made up 22 percent of the
data set (S1P4, in which S stands for “study” and P for
“participant”; 2 hours 26 minutes). After Coder B had
finished coding this interview, the initial degree of in-
ter-rater agreement was established. Agreement was
defined as each instance of the same code being ap-
plied by both coders to a coherent segment. However,
the  structure  of  the  data  and  the  way  they  were
coded hindered the calculation of standard reliability
indices;  consequently,  no  statements  can  be  made
about true inter-rater reliability. Calculation of a relia-
bility index requires the data to be pre-divided into a
fixed number of units, resulting in a concrete number
of data units on which raters agreed and disagreed,
respectively. However, in our study, raters created the
data units while coding. In other words, the data to
which no codes were applied remained undivided into
units – thus, we can count the units on which raters
agreed, but not those on which they disagreed. Con-
sequently, our evaluation of inter-rater agreement is
limited to the percentage of overlap. 
Coders A and B then discussed all instances of dis-
agreement in order to determine the cause of the dis-
agreement and whether it could be resolved. For each
instance of disagreement, the possible outcomes were
resolution in favour of Coder A, resolution in favour of
Coder  B,  or  non-resolution.  The  level  of  inter-rater
agreement was then re-assessed. Table 2 presents the
resulting  overlap  before  and  after  discussion.  As
demonstrated by the considerable improvement in in-
ter-coder overlap post discussion,  it  was possible  to
resolve most conflicts; they were found to be mostly
due to simple lapses of concentration attributable to
the large number of codes or to uncertainty resulting
from the occasional vagueness of the interview mate-
rial. In several instances, the coders were able to agree
on what would fall under the code’s definition but not




For the second part of the study, semi-structured in-
terviews were  conducted with seven experts  on the
(de-)radicalization  process.  The  target  group  were
staff  at  German  state-  or  privately-run  exit  pro-
grammes (n = 6 and n = 1,  respectively) – in other
words, professionals who work directly with radical-
ijcv.org
Table 2: Inter-coder agreement per code, calculated before and after discussion
Pre Post
Code Overlap % 1* Overlap % 2** Overlap %
Need to belong 28.57 35.71 92.86
Emotional uncertainty 41.67 41.67 91.67
Need for justice na na na
Need for sensation na na na
Need for romance 50 50 100
Need for existential meaning 0 66.67 100
Need for status 80 80 100
Note: * Basis of calculation: number of agreements (each agreement is coded as 1, each disagreement as 0) di-
vided by total number of codes (sum total of codes used by both coders). ** After the first round of coding, 
Coder B received additional explanations of “Need for existential meaning”, which they had not understood 
completely or correctly. Coder B then had the opportunity to re-evaluate their coding before discussion of the 
interview with Coder A. The first two columns represent these two coding rounds. “na” stands for “not applic-
able” – this code did not appear anywhere and was correctly not coded by either of the coders.
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ized  individuals  seeking  help  to  leave  their  radical
group (see Table 3). All these programmes pursue the
same  basic  intervention  approach  (targeting  disen-
gagement before deradicalization by first helping the
client  to change their  circumstances  –  for  example,
move, find a new job, build a new social circle – and
then starting to work on their mindset). The state-run
programmes have some advantages in terms of giving
practical  support  to  their  clients  in  their  everyday
lives: They have funds to assist a client moving to a
new city if this is necessary, and state employees are
widely  regarded  as  reliable  and  trustworthy  which
they can utilize to vouch for their clients when a land-
lord is hesitant to let an apartment to them or an em-
ployer is hesitant to hire them. 
Participants  were  recruited  via  e-mail:  First,  we
compiled a list of suitable programmes in Germany,
which  was  complete  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge.
The  directors  of  these  programmes  were  all  subse-
quently contacted to ask for their cooperation. Inter-
views were conducted with everyone who responded
to  these  messages.  The  interviews  were  conducted
face-to-face  at  the  interviewee’s  workplace  in  June
2018, recorded and later transcribed. 
Our expert sample consisted of employees from pro-
grammes  working  on  various  types  of  ideologies:
some worked on right-  and left-wing  radicalization,
while  others  specialized  in  Islamicized  religious  ex-
tremism.  Similarities  between religious  and political
radicalization have been found in terms of risk factors
(Doosje et al. 2012; Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos
2013; Schils and Verhage 2017), individual motivations
(Webber and Kruglanski 2018) and factors leading to
disengagement  and  deradicalization  (Barrelle  2014;
Harris,  Gringart,  and  Drake  2017;  Webber  and
Kruglanski 2018). The minor differences that did occur
between ideologies are discussed below.
3.2.2 Interview
Guiding  questions  (Appendix  2)  for  the  semi-struc-
tured interviews were developed on the basis of the
theoretical background and the findings from the data
analysis in Study 1. The interview consisted of an in-
troductory  section  (professional  background,  daily
routines at work), a section on radicalization, another
on deradicalization (both of which addressed recogni-
tion of different types of (de)radicalization as well as
examples), and a concluding section in which the in-
terviewees had the opportunity to provide concluding
remarks, add information or ask questions. 
3.2.3 Analysis
The interviews were transcribed using the software f4-
transkript  according  to  standard  transcription  rules
(Fuß and Karbach 2014) and checked against the orig-
inal  audio  recordings  for  accuracy.  The methods  of
analysis  and  coding  procedure  were  analogous  to
those used in Study 1. The order in which the inter-
views were coded was determined by a random num-
ber generator. As there were seven interviews (9 hours
36 minutes in total), the interview chosen for double-
coding by a random number generator (S2P4, 1 hour
33 minutes) made up 16 percent of the data set. Table
4 presents the overlap between the two coders in per-
cent before and after discussion. The strong increase
in agreement after discussion paralleled that in Study
1. 
Finally, the interviewees from Study 2 were provided
with their own interview transcripts as well as a draft
of the analyses. They were invited to respond and re-
quest  corrections,  but  none  of  them did.  The  tran-
scripts from Study 2 are available on motivated re-
quest to the first author; concerning Study 1, contact
to the Research Center which provided us with the
data will gladly be established upon request. For fur-
ther  details  on  the  methodology  see  Reiter,  Doosje
and Feddes (2021).
4 Results
We hypothesized that the psychological needs mak-
ing up the four seeker types introduced above would
all be reflected in the data. Additionally, we hypothe-
sized that evidence of identity and significance seek-
ing would appear more frequently than the other two
types. Figure 1 illustrates the quantitative portion of
our analyses: a side-by-side comparison of the quanti-
tative result patterns in both studies. Participants are
labelled by study number and participant number; in
other words, S1P2 refers to participant number 2 from
study 1 (a disengaged person), S2P4 to an expert from
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4.1 Need to Belong and Emotional Uncertainty –
Identity Seeker Type 
Need to belong was reported most frequently in both
studies. The need for social belonging was considered
a key factor by all experts, particularly for right-wing
extremists. For example, S2P2: 
“Conditions [at home] are often precarious, (…) and the
children who are socialized like this don’t develop high
self-esteem, and then they search for people they can
latch on to, for group membership – they are well-ac-
cepted in those groups, they are treated well, and in the
end that is what causes this strong connection to the
right-wing scene.” 
Similarly, one expert named need to belong as one of
the  most  important  factors  in  deradicalization,  at
least for right-wing extremists: “What brings us rather
a lot of people wanting to de-radicalize is the begin-
ijcv.org
Table 4: Inter-coder agreement per code, calculated before and after discussion
Pre Post
Code Overlap %* Overlap %
Need to belong 35.71 86.67
Emotional uncertainty 50 100
Need for justice 60 100
Need for sensation 100 100
Need for romance 100 100
Need for existential meaning 60 100
Need for status 40 80
Note: * Basis of calculation: number of agreements (each agreement is coded as 1, each disagreement as 0) di -
vided by total number of codes (sum total of codes used by both coders).
Figure 1: Frequency of the seven psychological needs in the two studies
Note: The numbers displayed represent the absolute number of times each need was coded across all interviews.
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ning of a new relationship (…) with someone outside
the scene” (S2P7). 
Personal uncertainty was the second most commonly
cited motivation in both studies. One frequently men-
tioned aspect thereof was uncertainty avoidance mo-
tivation, a longing for clear and strict rules, for exam-
ple S1P3: “(…) [in Islam] there’s an answer to every-
thing. Christianity doesn’t have that, no other religion
has that.”  This motivation also includes seeking out
structure in general – for example S2P2: “(…) with a
pure follower type, it’s very important to give him sta-
bility, and to replace the group with that – that works
very well”.  Another aspect concerned defining one’s
identity and thus gaining personal security; for exam-
ple, interviewee S2P3 described a strong need for gen-
der identity affirmation as a way to combat feelings of
uncertainty in life: 
“There’s  something  very  martial  about  the right-wing
extremist scene, especially for the men, there’s a huge
obsession with masculinity, everyone needs to have big
[muscular] arms and so on. And for women, too, there
are clear roles. And that offers a lot of security.”
Notably,  the  construct  of  gender  identity  is  highly
complex and could thus touch upon several psycho-
logical needs described in our typology. However, in
the context of this interviewee’s quote, we argue that
it is most strongly linked to identity-related personal
uncertainty; seeking to consolidate one’s identity by
investing in one’s association with a social group is in
keeping with the principles of social  identity theory
(Tajfel  and  Turner  [1979]  2004a,  Tajfel  and  Turner
[1986] 2004b).  Putting effort  into performing gender
has elements of this, as this performance ensures that
members of both the ingroup and outgroup recognize
and accept the performer as part of the group.
There is some evidence in the data to support a co-
herent  identity seeker type. Specifically, while the in-
terviewees  in  study  2  produced  various  typologies,
identity seeking appeared to be a constant: S2P2 de-
scribed “classic followers” (which is in line with a dis-
tinction suggested by Bjørgo,  2011),  insecure people
willing to follow any group and ideology if it can give
them structure and identity. S2P3 and S2P6 both dis-
tinguished radicalization due to ideological conviction
from ideology used as a mere justifying re-interpreta-
tion  of  a  pre-existing  criminal  career  (labelling  the
latter “secondary radicalization”); this justification be-
comes part of the personal biographical narrative and
thus  serves  to  shape  and  define  identity.  S2P7  de-
scribed the intersection of need to belong and need
for personal security as the key element in his work:
“This has really been, throughout these seventeen and a
half years, the central, recurrent theme in all de-radical-
ized  clients’  biographies.  It  is  very  noticeable  that,  in
most cases, the father figure was absent, and therefore
they sought  this  father  figure  among older  comrades,
older like-minded people, just anyone who would take
their hand and give them a feeling of security and [say]
‘I’ll give your life direction’. That is the mark of all de-
radicalized biographies.” 
And S2P1 explicitly stated: 
“The  identity  type  is  certainly  the  largest  portion.  I
think that’s – psychologically – also part of adolescence,
[asking yourself] who am I, where am I from. For ex-
ample, [let’s say] I have a Turkish background, I’m per-
ceived  as  a  Turkish  person,  but  maybe  I  don’t  even
speak the Turkish language and I try to define myself
via religion, to find my identity.” 
4.2 Need for Existential Meaning and Need for 
Status – Significance Seeker Type 
Need for existential  meaning overlapped to some ex-
tent with personal uncertainty, in that providing clear
and simple answers to complex questions appeals to
both of these needs. The need for existential meaning,
purpose and answers to fundamental questions was
more prevalent in Study 1 than in Study 2; for exam-
ple, S1P3: 
“Why am I alive, what is the meaning of my life? Chris-
tianity doesn’t provide an answer to that. Why did God
create man? Yes,  he  wanted an image of  himself,  but
why, Christianity doesn’t provide an answer to that.” 
This difference might be related to the different data
sources. Need for existential meaning is a profoundly
personal, fundamental and potentially spiritual need,
which interviewees talking about radicalization from
a  first-person  perspective  might  be  more  likely  to
identify and describe than experts working with radi-
calized people, whose work tends to focus on hands-
on  support  in  rebuilding  a  life  after  radicalization.
However, our sample is too small to make conclusive
claims  about  the  source  of  these differences  in  fre-
quencies.  Some interviewees  in  Study 2,  leaning  on
the concept of primary and secondary radicalization
explained above,  theorized that people mainly moti-
vated by a quest for existential meaning might also
exist  within  non-religious  radical  groups,  such  as
right-wing groups, but be less likely to seek out a de-
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radicalization programme or even less likely to disen-
gage in general. In any case, the experts reported that
they rarely worked with people motivated by a need
for existential meaning – for example, in the words of
S2P3:  “We do get those,  the ideologues (…) but the
majority are different.” The experts also indicated that
the question of purpose needs to be considered when
providing  support  to  a  client’s  deradicalization
process. 
Need  for  status was  an  important  motive  in  both
studies and included instances of wanting to feel im-
portant, perhaps powerful, and thus seeking out be-
haviours that increase one’s social prestige – for ex-
ample, S1P4 described a Salafist group he became af-
filiated with for a while thus: 
“For me they were, whenever I saw them on the inter-
net, they were stars, like celebrities. Then I really [per-
sonally] saw them in [city] and told them ‘I want to join
you’.” 
This can include a quest for dominance. For example,
expert S2P1 elaborated: 
“What I notice over and over again, and that’s not ne-
cessarily  independent  from  a  quest  for  identity,  is  a
quest for power. (…) This quest for power in the sense of
‘I want to be looked up to and to be the one in charge’,
that is, I think, a very important motivator – not for all
of our clients, but for some. Especially those with nar-
cissistic personality structures”. 
Need for status is also closely linked to self-image. For
example S2P3: 
“(…) many say that in the beginning they were just tag-
ging along, and then when the first crimes are commit-
ted, you just get carried away, and you feel very power-
ful, you think ‘wow, awesome, I’m a total hero now’”. 
Consequently, self-esteem and self-efficacy beliefs are
key elements of the resource-oriented approach to de-
radicalization work.
In summary, need for existential meaning and need
for status are sometimes linked, but need for status
also seems to be a key motive in the absence of need
for existential meaning, as demonstrated by the fact
that the former was far more frequent in study 2 than
the latter. Need for status was overall described as the
more prevalent motive. There could be a social desir-
ability bias at play here; people might be less likely to
admit to being motivated by a need for status them-
selves  than  to  identify  this  motivation  in  someone
else. The interviewees also described linkages between
need for existential meaning and need for status with
other motivational needs. Overall, the two needs are
not  connected  strongly  and  exclusively  enough  to
speak of a coherent significance seeker type.
4.3 Need for Romance, Need for Sensation and 
Need for Justice – Sensation Seeker and Justice 
Seeker Types 
The need for romance and the need for sensation each
played  a  minor  role  in  Study  1.  One  interviewee
(S1P4) mentioned that in learning more about Islam,
he was hoping to become more appealing to Muslim
girls.  Another  interviewee  explained  that  young
women  are  sometimes  tricked  into  joining  radical
groups by promises of a romantic, better life in a new
country  (S1P1).  She  also  explained  that  she  briefly
wore a niqab because it was a thrill to see how people
would react to her on the streets. Overall, the results
of Study 1 are not in line with a coherent  sensation
seeker type. 
The results of Study 2 differed in that need for sensa-
tion was  mentioned  more  frequently,  although  fre-
quency alone is not an accurate depiction of the fac-
tor’s importance here. When asked about the impor-
tance of need for sensation in the right-wing extrem-
ist scene, interviewee S2P7 elaborated that it is merely
secondary to,  and therefore usually coupled with,  a
need to belong or need for status: 
“If I want to go on an adventure alone, if I do something
crazy  alone,  I  haven’t  gained  any  status  with  others
with that. Okay, in the age of social media, I can post on
Instagram about  putting  up  some crazy  posters  on  a
church tower by myself or something, like the Identit-
arian movement [a right-wing group], but even they do
it  as  a  group  activity,  because  (…)  in  a  community,
you’re  stronger,  that  is  true  for  both  extremists  and
democratically minded people.” 
This is  in line with other interviewees’  descriptions:
Need for sensation plays a role in prolonging mem-
bership in the right-wing scene, which can serve as a
source of entertainment (involving alcohol,  concerts,
and occasionally violent confrontations with the po-
lice – all of which creates positive emotional ties to
the group). Likewise, it has been described as pushing
members of the Islamicized religious extremist scene
to emigrate and become foreign fighters (in Syria, for
example). It does not, however, generally seem to be a
factor that can stand on its own as a motivation. The
same  seems  to  be  the  case  for  need  for  romance,
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which interestingly was only mentioned by the two
interviewees working with Islamist religious extrem-
ists (three times overall). Again, the results are not in
line with the idea of a coherent sensation seeker type.
While  need for justice was not mentioned at all in
Study 1, it was mentioned twenty-four times in Study
2 – but again, frequency does not tell the whole story.
Some classified a strong need for justice as common
among  the  “primary  radicalization”  type,  together
with need for existential meaning, as described above;
for example, S2P1, when asked about clients who had
left for Syria:  “The ideological  conviction ‘I  have  to
help them and I have to mete out justice’ was simply
stronger”. Other experts had different thoughts about
the need for justice: They stated that some of their
clients were not genuinely feeling a need to mete out
justice but  rather using this  claim as an excuse for
their behaviour, a strategy for justifying their involve-
ment in the radical group; expert S2P5 added that this
strategy  is  also  commonly  used  by  radical  groups
themselves: 
“I’d  be  careful  about  need  for  justice,  because  sure,
that’s often what it looks like from the outside, all that
‘us against the others’ and ‘they’re so well off and we’re
doing  so  poorly’,  but  I  think  sometimes  that’s  just  a
strategy, an argumentative strategy being used”. 
Expert S2P2 theorized that where the need for justice
is genuine and strong, deradicalization is unlikely. The
concept of the  justice seeker as an independent type
does not appear justified from these results.
4.4 Relations with Phases of Radicalization
We explored possible correlations between phases of
our process model and psychological needs. It must be
noted that our capacity to observe such relations was
limited by the fact that our studies covered different
parts of the process: The sample in Study 1 consisted
of people who had deradicalized independently early
in  the process,  while  the experts  in  Study 2  talked
about their experiences with people who had under-
gone the entire process of radicalization up to and in-
cluding violent extremism. Bearing this in mind, we
observed a pattern: Among those who were originally
attracted to the radical group by their need to belong,
emotional  uncertainty  and/or  need for  status,  need
for justice became relevant around the transition from
the membership to action phase. The longer someone
is a member of a radical group, the more strongly they
are indoctrinated by the group in terms of ideology
and perceived injustices against the in-group; eventu-
ally, the individual begins to justify their behaviour in
the name of justice. 
5 Discussion
In the present article, we examined seven psychologi-
cal  needs  motivating  (de-)radicalization  and  how
these needs are related to one another. To this end, we
conducted a two-part interview study utilizing differ-
ent data sources. We hypothesized that our qualita-
tive  data  would  mention  the  seven  psychological
needs, nested in four seeker types, described in Mac-
dougall et al.’s model: need to belong and personal un-
certainty (making up the identity seeker type), need
for existential meaning and need for status (making
up the significance seeker type),  need for sensation
and  need  for  romance  (making  up  the  sensation
seeker type), and need for justice (the justice seeker
type). Furthermore, we expected that identity seeker
and significance seeker would be the types described
most frequently and regarded as most important. 
As expected, all seven needs were represented in the
data, and those related to identity issues and social
belonging  were  most  frequently  reported  and  most
heavily emphasized. However, contrary to our expec-
tations, there was too much overlap for a clearly de-
marcated typology to hold up; not only did most in-
terviewees  discuss  several  needs  rather  than  one
prominent need, but common combinations of needs
transcended the typology. Personal uncertainty often
interacted  with need to  belong  when the  quest  for
identity definition was a strong motive, while also in-
teracting with need for existential meaning when peo-
ple reported a strong desire for definitive answers and
guidance. Additionally, if one were to create a typol-
ogy based on the results of Study 2, there would be
two broad main types instead of four: One main type
would be people chiefly motivated by need to belong
and personal  uncertainty,  while  the other would be
people motivated by personal  uncertainty and need
for status and the other needs (for sensation, for ro-
mance and for justice) would take a subordinated role
at  different  stages  of  the  (de-)radicalization  process
rather than consistently belonging to one type. Ulti-
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mately, it is more useful to acknowledge the impor-
tance of each of these motives for what they are than
to try and force them into coherent types. 
Overall, the importance of these motives in our data
is in line with previous radicalization literature, which
has highlighted the central role of uncertainty and the
quest  for  significance and definition  as  a  motivator
(van den Bos 2018,  Dugas and Kruglanski  2014),  as
well as the role of the need to belong as a central mo-
tive in human behaviour in a broader sense (Baumeis-
ter et al. 2007, Baumeister and Leary 1995). The fre-
quent coincidence of need to belong and personal un-
certainty, indicative of attempts to gain security and
define one’s identity through association with a social
group, is also in keeping with social identity theory
(Tajfel  and  Turner  [1979]  2004a,  Tajfel  and  Turner
[1986] 2004b). Associating oneself strongly with a so-
cial group can reduce uncertainty in numerous ways.
For example, uncertainty about everyday life, what to
think about certain things, what to do and how to act
can be reduced by aligning oneself with a social group
that prescribes a coherent set of attitudinal and be-
havioural  rules.  Similarly,  uncertainty  about  one’s
identity and values can be reduced by making mem-
bership in a social group a central part of one’s per-
sonal identity, as the group will typically provide a set
of norms and values to guide attitudes and behaviour;
for  example,  right  wing  groups  typically  have  clear
rules about whom their members should and should
not associate with, which entertainment they should
consume,  how  they  should  perform  gender,  which
people are inferior to the ingroup and how these peo-
ple should be treated. These rules may largely be com-
municated implicitly,  but they are enforced through
social  sanctioning of  non-compliance and rewarding
compliance. However, social belonging is a basic hu-
man  need  that  goes  beyond  uncertainty  reduction
and  identity  construction;  in  other  words,  while  in
some people need to belong and personal uncertainty
overlap,  and they  seek out  group membership  as  a
way to define themselves and give themselves struc-
ture and rules, other people who report need to be-
long as a motive simply join radical groups because
they are lonely. This is why it is important to consider
these psychological motives individually.
Regarding personal uncertainty and need for status,
it is important to highlight the multiple facets making
up need for status. In both studies, the word “power”
was frequently used, and the concept of power-seek-
ing was highlighted as  a  central  motive.  Of course,
power and status are not identical; power is the abil-
ity to achieve and control certain things, to success-
fully  pursue  one’s  interests  and  exert  social  domi-
nance.  Status  and power  are  closely  linked:  Having
real power in some area of life will boost an individ-
ual’s status in their peer group, but at the same time,
having a certain status in a peer group will give an in-
dividual  a  spot  in  that  group’s  hierarchy  and  give
them power over those beneath them. Our interviews
indicated that while the actual power achieved in a
radical group is often limited, it is the subjective feel-
ing of power that people with a strong need for status
motive seek. These are often people whose social sta-
tus is low, for example because they are unsuccessful
in their education or career and aware or convinced
that  they  are  unable  to  change  this;  these  circum-
stances can negatively impact self-efficacy beliefs and
self-esteem  more  generally.  However,  these  deficits
can be compensated by achieving power, status and
agency in some other area of life.  In short:  When a
person believes that they have a low social status due
to frequent experiences  of  failure and believes  they
are unable to change this, they may reorient toward
the more limited social  hierarchy of a new ingroup,
such as a radical group, within which they are able to
improve their social status through their actions. 
A possible third main type derived from the expert
interviews can be described as “the ideologue” or “the
primarily radicalized” – a type unifying need for exis-
tential meaning and need for justice, and marked by a
strong and primary commitment to the radical ideol-
ogy, as opposed to adopting the ideology as a means
to  other  ends.  This  motivation  was  described  more
often in Study 1 than in Study 2, perhaps due to selec-
tion bias. As one of the interviewees explained, people
who  radicalized  due  to  this  motivation  tend  to  be
more deeply and genuinely committed to the ideology
and are therefore less likely to seek the help of a de-
radicalization programme; this could explain why al-
most all experts mentioned this type of radical, yet al-
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most none of them reported having come across such
a case in their programme. 
Additionally, source bias might be at work: On the
one  hand,  because  need  for  existential  meaning  is
conceivably a more socially desirable motivation than
need  to  belong  or  need  for  status  (social  isolation,
loneliness, and low self-esteem are all perceived as un-
desirable  qualities,  whereas  a  need  for  existential
meaning can be stylized into something profound and
heroic), people might be more likely to claim this mo-
tivation for themselves in their self-reports than ex-
perts talking about people they worked with. On the
other hand, this motive might also have been present
in the people the experts worked with, but not quite
within the focus of the experts, who tend to focus on
more hands-on factors they can utilize in their work
(such as job prospects,  changing the social  environ-
ment, etc.). 
In contrast to these most common needs, the needs
for  justice,  sensation  and  romance  seem  to  play  a
merely  supporting  role;  it  is  common for  people  to
join radical groups because of other motives, but once
they  are a  member,  they  are offered  adventure,  ro-
mance and/or the conviction that they are acting in
the  name  of  justice,  and  these  factors  add  to  the
group’s attractiveness. The different roles these moti-
vational needs seemed to play in the process accord-
ing to our interviewees suggest that the proposed ty-
pology  did  not  describe  the  data  well,  and any  at-
tempt to frame them within an alternative typology
would  likely  prove  equally  restrictive;  hence  these
needs are best examined individually,  as this  allows
the model to be more flexible.
Finally, it is notable that the meaningful differences
lie between motivations, rather than ideologies (politi-
cal  or  religious).  The  attractiveness  of  a  particular
group or ideology varies according to the psychologi-
cal needs currently salient to a person. We found that
often, when people are motivated by a need for iden-
tity and a need to belong, ideology is basically inter-
changeable  –  the  group selected  is  simply  the  first
group to come along and offer something that meets
the  person’s  needs.  Other  groups  focus  on  specific
motivations  –  one  example  from  Study  2  was  the
PKK, a radical pro-Kurdish group which appeals ex-
clusively to people of Kurdish ethnicity who are moti-
vated by a need for justice and existential meaning.
One notable difference between ideologies concerned
the reintegration process after disengagement: a dif-
ference in stigmatization. An expert reported that for-
mer left-wing extremists face the fewest obstacles and
least  social  stigma  when  trying  to  return  to  main-
stream society,  while  right-wing extremists and for-
mer  Islamicized  religious  extremists  frequently  face
grave problems (in Germany – this order is likely to
vary interculturally). The expert reported this observa-
tion, but had no conclusive explanation for it; one fac-
tor might be that left-wing extremism is simply much
less prominent in the German public debate than the
other two types and when it does come into focus, it
is  typically  related  to  property  damage rather  than
personal violence or terrorist attacks. Another factor
might be that the ideology behind left-wing radical
movements is perceived as more utopian rather than
purely hateful. However, this is speculation and any
such perceptions depend on the cultural context.
5.1 Limitations and Strengths
While  a  larger  sample  size  is  always  desirable,  this
factor is not as problematic in qualitative studies like
the  present  one,  because  generalisation  is  not  the
goal. However, the small sample is worth noting, as is
the particular composition of the sample in Study 1:
The sample was almost exclusively female, with only
one  male  out  of  five  interviewees.  This  is  atypical,
considering that radicalization and ideologically moti-
vated crime are a predominantly male issue (see, for
example, Statistisches Bundesamt 2018, 28).1 The issue
of gender differences in radicalization is an important
one, and systematic research on this topic is needed;
however, our own capacities to discuss these are lim-
ited due to the asymmetry in our data sets. While our
data from Study 1 exclusively concern the early stages
of radicalization among subjects who were largely fe-
male (four out of five),  the experts in Study 2 work
with clients who went through the final stages of rad-
icalization and, in many cases,  committed crimes in
1 Articles 129a to 130 Par. 4 of the German Penal Code con-
cern various ideologically motivated crimes; note that in the
criminal prosecution statistics referenced here, the rows 
marked with i stand for the total number of crimes and the 
rows marked with m  for the number of crimes committred 
by males. The statistics show that the perpetrators of all 
these ideologically motivated crimes were mostly men. 
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relation to this. Hence, their knowledge is based on a
more representative – mostly male – sample. Insofar
as the patterns in our results overlapped between the
two studies despite this asymmetry, this can be con-
sidered an argument for their robustness. 
Secondly,  neither  the  sampling nor  the  interviews
were conducted with a focus on radicalization: we re-
ceived a sub-sample from a study on Muslims’ reli-
gious development conducted among a sample of self-
identified devout Muslims with a very open method-
ology, and the selection criterion for the sub-sample
was contact with radical groups. Both this sampling
and the open, non-specific interview method likely re-
sulted in  us missing out on information that  might
have otherwise been gained from more targeted inter-
views. There was a second, related sampling issue in
Study 1: Since all participants had disengaged during
the  early  stages  of  radicalization,  the  information
gained from these participants is very particular. Ar-
guably, people who disengage very early could be ex-
pected to be systematically different from those who
disengage very late in the process. However, our re-
sults from Study 2, in which we collected secondary-
source data by interviewing experts about people who
had gone through the final stages of radicalization be-
fore disengaging, largely replicated the patterns found
in Study 1 (except for some differences regarding need
for status and need for existential meaning). Thus, we
conclude  that  our  different  data  sources  actually
speak to the robustness of the patterns found.
At the same time, the methodology of Study 1 has
some  advantages,  particularly  in  combination  with
the data from Study 2. The very open narrative inter-
view format gave participants room to set their own
focus and highlight the factors that seemed most im-
portant to them in their own development. The com-
bination of primary-source and secondary-source data
from the two studies, respectively, allowed us to offset
potential biases in each data source (social desirability
in the first and lack of insight into certain aspects in
the second study, as explained above concerning the
examples of need for existential meaning and need for
status)  and examine motives  for  radicalization from
different points of view. The fact that the distributions
of psychological needs were largely the same in both
studies  speaks  to  the  validity  of  the  motivational
model we explored. The central motives discussed by
researchers  and  combined  in  the  model  by  Mac-
dougall et al. seem to accurately reflect what is cen-
tral  to  people  who  have  experienced  radicalization
first-hand and what experts experience in their work. 
Finally, potential reliability issues limit our data’s in-
terpretability. As explained above, the structure of our
data and the way they were coded did not allow for
the calculation of any of the conventional indices. As
a result, the only index of interrater agreement that
could be established is the percentage overlap, which
is a limited indicator of reliability. 
That  said,  although interrater  agreement  on most
codes was mediocre during the first round of coding
in both studies (Study 1: M = 55 percent; Study 2: M =
64  percent),  the  coders  reached  100  percent  agree-
ment on the majority of codes after discussion. Agree-
ment for the first round of coding also improved over-
all between Study 1 and Study 2, which is indicative
of a learning curve. This demonstrates that the coding
system was complex  and extensive,  which  placed a
burden on the coders’ concentration, but was reason-
ably clear and applicable overall. In particular, inter-
coder overlap for the psychological needs was higher
in  comparison  to  the  other  factors  included  in  the
complete coding scheme. 
5.2 Implications
The key findings from our study for practitioners are
firstly,  that  underlying  psychological  motives  affect
individuals’  sensitivity  to  different  (de-)radicalizing
factors – as demonstrated by the finding that differ-
ent psychological needs make different radical groups
and ideologies appealing to the individual – and, sec-
ondly, that rather than try to find an ideal typology, it
is useful to observe the psychological needs salient for
a person and how they might change over time, as
often multiple  needs  are  present  and their  saliency
may change depending on the extent to which they
are being met. For example, if a person’s need for sta-
tus  is  very strong, a practitioner may help them to
disengage from their radical group by employing mea-
sures that increase their self-esteem and perceived so-
cial value, such as career development measures, edu-
cation, volunteer activities, etc. 
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Notably, we do not have the data to conduct an in-
depth comparison of radicalization and deradicaliza-
tion in this study, but we can observe that in general,
the motives behind deradicalization will likely be con-
nected to those behind radicalization. It is important
to realize that when people enter the deradicalization
phase,  they  may also  enter  a  new phase  of  life,  in
which their  original  motivations  may be fulfilled in
another manner. For example, people who were moti-
vated  to  join  a  radical  group  by  sensation  seeking
may want to find alternative ways to fulfil this need
for sensation, such as an exciting and physically chal-
lenging sport.
Our findings should also encourage researchers to
think of  political  and religious  radicalization not  as
two  entirely  separate  and  fundamentally  different
phenomena, and instead focus on each person’s indi-
vidual underlying psychological motives. Finally, given
the crucial role of need to belong in the pre-existing
literature and our study, policy measures which foster
social inclusion of groups vulnerable to radicalization
– such as initiatives facilitating employment and edu-
cation  or  policy  communication  which  lessens  the
perceived intergroup gap – should be seen as forms of
preventive measures. In general, initiatives to support
at-risk  youth by  promoting  social  inclusion,  self-es-
teem and self-efficacy are the most basic forms of rad-
icalization prevention a state can undertake and can
be expected to affect a large portion of those at risk
for radicalization.
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Appendix 1
All Codes Used in Study 1, Sorted Within Categories by Frequency of Usage and Including Definitions and 
Examples




1V Vulnerability phase: a period dur-
ing which a number of risk factors 
are present making the individual 
susceptible to radical ideologies (as
well as other harmful influences).
0 -
 
2E Exploration phase: a period during
which the individual is actively 
seeking to engage with and ac-
quire knowledge about a poten-
tially radical ideology.
23 1.1: “For example, when I started to be-
come religious, I followed some Muslim 
websites, so to speak, then I followed some
other websites and eventually a lot of 
Muslim sites which were posting about Is-
lamic topics and so on. And I don’t remem-
ber how I got into the WhatsApp groups, 
but I suppose I somehow met some girls, 
the stuff I posted was the sort of thing 
through which one would meet other girls, 
for example in the comment section (…)”
 
3M Membership phase: a period that 
starts with the individual joining a
radical group (physically or per-
haps virtually) and lasting for the 
entire period during which the 
person remains in the group
9 1.4: “(…) to me, when I kept seeing them on
the internet, they were like stars to me, like
celebrities. So I really met them in [city] 
and I said ‘I want to join you, please,’ im-
mediately, the first time I saw them. They 
said ‘Yes, please come by tomorrow,’ we 
talked about everything, how everything 
would go and so on and then I joined 
them.”
 
4A Action phase: a period during 
which the individual partakes in 
violent group activities or engages 
in criminal or generally violent 
activities because of their ideology
and/or group membership.
0 -
  5D Disengagement/ deradicalization 
phase: a period during which the 
individual physically or mentally 
distances him- or herself from viol-
ent actions, a radical group or the 
radical ideology itself.
9 1.4: “(…) until it got very extreme due to 
this hatred for the Shiites and I got 
blocked [on a social media website] and 
then I told myself ‘No, if you do this kind 
of thing again, you might be reported to 
the police or something,’ and since I’ve 
2 All interviews analysed here were conducted in German. Examples selected here were translated for publication by the au-
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never caught the police’s attention and 
hopefully never will, I told myself ‘You 
better just stop this,’ and well.”
Micro-level T_dom Domestic problems: any grave 
problems within the domestic 
sphere, examples include financial 
problems in the family, intense in-
trafamilial conflict, or problematic 
behaviour by family members, 
such as crime, drug abuse etc.
46 1.2: “(…) my parents separated very early. 
They’d gotten married in secret because of 
my dad’s parents, they are very narrow-
minded. (…) So I basically grew up within 
the custody battle between them (…)”
 
T_disc Discrimination, racism and general
exclusion: any experiences of ra-
cially or non-racially motivated ex-
clusion, such as bullying, verbal 
attacks aimed at perceived group 
membership, etc.
42 1.1: “Once when I was 14, during gym 
class, my teacher said to me ‘I heard you 
were getting married off against your will. 
Is that true?’ And I told him ‘No, that’s not
true,’ and in that moment, when I said 
that, I thought ‘How will I know if he be-
lieves me? Maybe he doesn’t believe me.’ 
And I felt so… disgusted, because I felt like 
my word had no value, like oh these op-
pressed women, we feel so sorry for them 
and when they speak, they only say 
whatever they say because they’re being 
forced to say it, that’s how I felt.”
 
T_persp Lack of perspective in the aca-
demic or professional sphere: ex-
periences of academic failure or 
lack of perspectives on the job 
market.
23 1.4: “(…) in 2014, I had to repeat my final 
year of high school, because I was always…
at the prison, visiting both of them [his 
parents], and I didn’t yet know what was 
going on at the time.”
 
T_aut Negative experiences with author-
ities: encounters any official rep-
resentatives or employees of the 
state (police, administrative bod-
ies, etc.) that were perceived neg-
atively.
17 1.4: “And then, on January 4, the police 
came with seven policemen, they kicked in 
the door and chased me out of bed, they 
asked where my father was, etc., [so I said]
‘At the gym I guess,’ then I called there and
he came home and promised me he would 
come back home tomorrow, and they took 
him with them. (…) And then I asked the 
policemen ‘Can I please call my mother, 
this is all too much for me right now?’ and 
they said ‘No, you don’t need to, and 
please speak German when you talk to 
your father’ (…) and then I found out that 
my mother had been arrested in [city] 
while she was transporting [my father’s 
drugs]. And that was why she was not 
home yet.”
  T_death Encounters with death: deaths of 
family members, friends or any 
other people of significance to the 
individual; confrontations with 
9 1.3: “My mother suffered from Lyme dis-
ease and cancer and died when I was 14, so
I didn’t grow up completely normally, that 
doesn’t happen to everyone.”
ijcv.org
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one’s own mortality.
 
T_det Detention: Any amount of time 
spent in police custody or prison.
0 -
Meso-level T_socb Cutting social bonds: any in-
stances in which the individual ini-
tiates the termination of a social 
relationship, usually in the course 
of and due to their increased com-
mitment to an ideology.
18 1.4: “[My social circle] became smaller. 
That was the change. I made very few new 
friends, but I cut ties with many, many 
more of them. Like I said, it was never be-
cause of who they were as a person, but 
more because they had different hobbies or
interests from which I was seeking to dis-
tance myself, because they weren’t relev-
ant to me. And for example, I used to love 
hookah, smoking hookah, and we used to 
have these evenings where we smoked 
hookah and played on the Playstation, 
FIFA, guys’ evenings, and I turned my back
on that, because I turned my back on the 
hookah, because I didn’t want to do that 
anymore, and I knew that they were al-
ways drinking alcohol, and I didn’t want to
take part in that anymore.”
  T_mrg Marriage (to a radical person as a 
radicalizing factor or to a non-rad-
ical person as a protective/deradic-
alizing factor). 
11 1.1: “(…) and now we’ve been married for 
one and a half years and I’m very happy 
and very satisfied, and I am glad that our 
marriage is going well. I’d rather be tested 
by God in all other areas and have diffi-
culties anywhere else but in my marriage. 
So I am really very happy and super satis-
fied.”
 
T_prpg Encounters with propaganda: en-
counters with materials intended 
to propagate a radical ideology, 
such as public sermons, pamph-
lets, books, websites, propaganda 
videos on YouTube, etc.
9 1.1: “And the standard run of the mill 
Muslim can’t differentiate there, because 
they all sound like they’re right, they all 
have good arguments, and you think, okay,
who’s right here, and everyone just picks 
someone, I know many people who got 
into this via the internet. On the internet, 
there’s just… there’s everything, from A to 
Z, and you never know, okay which one is 
the classic, normal [version] and there are 
many sects there and many people can’t 
differentiate between them, they just 
think, yes this must be right, this sounds 
logical. And then I also got into Salafism 
somewhat (…).”
  T_grp Joining a radical group: becoming 
a member of a physical or virtual 
radical group (including on social 
media). 
7 1.1: “And… mostly through the WhatsApp 
groups and Instagram, so social media, def-
initely, mostly social media, because these 
people are mostly active on social media, 
they don’t go outside or anything, well 
ijcv.org
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they do go outside, but they don’t go to 
the mosque. There are hardly any Salafists 
at the mosque.”
 
T_meet Meeting a radical person 4 1.1: “There are some Salafi mosques where 
the Salafists meet. And that’s how I got 
into this. But it only went on for two, three
months. There are people who were there 
for two, three years.”
 
T_cmp Participation in a training camp/
course: participation in one or 
more events organized by a radical
group and specifically designed to 
impart their ideology or prepare 
participants for radical actions.
1 1.4: “We always had these seminars… 
where I thought all the people, or most of 
the people who were there… weren’t quite 
right in the head, but that’s a different 
matter.”
Macro-level T_igatk Perceived attacks on the in-group: 
the individual perceives that an ac-
tion by an individual, a group or 
even a government is an attack on 
not just one or several people, but 
on the individual’s in-group as a 
whole. The individual therefore 
feels victimized even though the 
action in question may not affect 
him or her directly.
11 1.3: “What’s the problem if a student goes 
to pray for five minutes during lunch 
break? The others stand in the corner and 
smoke. What’s the problem? There’s no 
need for a separate prayer room, no one’s 
asking for that. But why can’t they just go 
stand in a corner and pray? There’s a big 
fuss around this, you talk about religious 
freedom, but we can’t pray in school any-
more, what do you want? That only leads 
to hatred.”
 
T_plcy Governmental policy aimed at rad-
icalization or at the in-group: the 
individual reacts adversely to gov-
ernmental policies aimed at the 
prevention of radicalization or the 
facilitation of deradicalization (for 
example state-run exit pro-
grammes) or at the in-group (for 
example laws affecting a particular
religious group).
6 1.3: [Talking about a new law prohibiting 
women from driving a car while wearing a 
burqa or niqab]: “It’s nonsense, it does not 
serve the purpose of the law. Because it’s 
not like there are reports in the media, mil-
lions of women wearing face veils are not 
paying their fines because they’re not re-
cognizable [in the pictures taken by traffic 
cameras]. That’s not the case. There’s a 60 
euro fine for that now. And I don’t know 
that there are any media reports during 
Carnival [Mardi Gras], all the people in 
Carnival masks are not identifiable, so they
go unpunished for driving over the speed 
limit. This law was only put in place be-
cause banning burqas completely in Ger-
many would not be legally possible, so 
they ban them at the wheel instead.”
 
T_cfact Calls for action: a radical group 
calling its members to action and 
others to join them, for example, 
IS announcing its founding in 
2014. 
1 1.1: “(…) that was also in 2014, that was 
also the year the IS was declared (…)”
Risk factors R_igid Ingroup identification: the degree 17 1.1: “(…) if there’s a Muslim in a class and 
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of in-group identification determ-
ines to what extent an individual 
feels that belonging to his or her 
in-group is central to his or her 
identity. 
then a topic comes up [connected to Is-
lam], that person is always the spokesper-
son, always the expert on Islam, even 
though sometimes that’s really… my sister 
is 12 and she is being treated just like that 
in her class, even though she doesn’t have 
a clue.”
 
R_soc Harmful social environment: the 
harmful absence or presence of so-
cial relationships; the former 
might be a non-existent or poor re-
lationship to attachment figures or
other significant people in the in-
dividual’s social environment, the 
latter might be the presence of so-
cial relationships with people who 
engage in and encourage criminal 
activities, drug abuse and other 
similar harmful behaviour.
10 1.4: “I had many Russians in my school, Al-
banians too, and I was hanging out only 
with them, but they weren’t good people, 
or good children at that time, they were 
the kind to screw things up, to throw 
stones through windows and so on. They 
were all in contact with Child Protective 
Services, and so they drew me in with 
them, and let me put it this way, if they 
already were this bad back then, and I’m 
speaking from experience based on cases 
I’m in charge of now [the interviewee has 
since become a social worker], and nothing
was done about it, it must get worse, and 
eventually, they’ll be criminals. And had I 
grown up there and had no one helped us, 
then we would have become criminals as 
well.”
 
R_iganx Intergroup anxiety: Feelings of 
anxiety related to perceived inter-
group conflicts and the con-
sequences these conflicts might 
have for the individual.
8 1.1: “And in the very beginning, I was 
scared, even though I have many Christian
friends as well, who are also very religious, 
and I get along with them very well, and 
even though I liked to meet with them, I 
was still afraid to do something with non-
Muslims. I was just scared of being ex-
posed to these prejudices again.”
 
R_men Mental health issues: reported dia-
gnoses or symptoms strongly sug-
gestive of diagnoses.
8 1.3: “(…) I went to a boarding school in 
Denmark in 2001, I was feeling heart-
broken and somehow I couldn’t cope with 
school, and so, stupidly, I attempted sui-
cide, and then I came back to Germany, to 
a psychiatric… a special depression ward… 
I learned a whole lot about depression, 
which didn’t really help. I don’t think all 
these psychiatric wards are really any 
help.”
 
R_pinj Perceived injustice: the perception 
that a group, most likely the indi-
vidual’s in-group, is being treated 
unfairly.
5 1.4: “I didn’t use to think like this, I used to
say ‘Terrorism is caused by the West, 
everything is always the West’s fault.’”
  R_depr Perceived relative deprivation (in-
dividual or collective): the percep-
4 1.4: “Muslims here in Germany are given 
many opportunities, but not this one, not 
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tion that the individual or the indi-
vidual’s in-group is somehow at a 
disadvantage compared to an out-
group. 
when it comes to having a really honest 
dialogue, and that is the problem.”
 
R_pt Perceived threat (symbolic or real-
istic): the perception that there is a
threat to symbols representative of
the in-group or to the in-group in 
economic or physical terms.  
3 1.1: [talking about her mother]: “She also 
didn’t want me to wear the khimar [a head
covering/veil covering the head, neck, and 
shoulders; more extensive than the hijab], 
because she was scared something would 
happen to me. She said ‘I’m scared that 
someone will attack you’ or something like 
that, because we know a woman who 
wears a normal headscarf, she comes from 
[city], and for example, when she was at 
the train station, someone hit her on the 
head and so on, even though she wears 
trousers and is dressed normally, she 
doesn’t even look very shocking in the way





nbel Need to belong: a desire for social 
belonging, for group membership.
38 1.1: “I also had real identity issues, am I 
Turkish, am I German, am I Muslim, is that
an identity and so on, so the standard 
problems.”
 
emunc Emotional uncertainty: feelings of 
uncertainty about one’s own iden-
tity, circumstances, life in general, 
etc. – resulting in a desire for un-
certainty avoidance.
28 1.2: “And I quite liked it at the group home 
[children’s home], because I had rules, my 
mother never used to get up with me in 
the morning, because she just couldn’t do 
it, she was up all night, and that means I 
always did all my stuff alone, I prepared 
breakfast alone and dressed myself, I 
washed myself, always, very, very early on.
And [at the children’s home] it was like 
this, you had to get up, then there was 
food, then there was time to wash oneself, 
and I liked that.”
 
nexmean Need for existential meaning: a de-
sire for definitive answers to life’s 
existential questions.
22 1.3: “I think it had to do with the eternal 
search for the meaning of life, at some 
point you think about that. In school we 
once had an assignment, ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’ My answer was ‘to find 
the meaning of life and live accordingly’, 
which I then went on to do.”
  nstat Need for status: a desire for high 
personal status, in the sense of a 
desire to be acknowledged and ap-
preciated as valuable, important; a 
desire to be looked up to.
11 1.1: “(…) maybe as a Muslim one has a cer-
tain inferiority complex, one’s always being
oppressed. There are wars in all Muslim 
countries and, I don’t know, one is being 
discriminated against and that leads to an 
inferiority complex and one tries to latch 
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onto something, and then one slides into 
this and everything falls into place.”
 
nrom Need for romance: a desire for 
short-term romantic entangle-
ment, focused more on the aspects
of adventure and excitement than 
that of long-term connection and 
social belonging.  
3 1.4: “I think this will sound rather paradox-
ical, but I believe that was part of the ap-
peal for me, because I knew that if I learn 
more about the religion, I might also be 
more attractive to Muslim girls (…)”
 
nsens Need for sensation: a desire for ad-
venture, for risk-taking and excite-
ment.
1 1.1: [On young women wanting to wear a 
niqab]: “And that’s how that seems to me, 
like someone who is very excited about 
something and wants to try it, and many 
said to me ‘I want to know how people will
look at me,’ and I even did that too, in the 
very beginning, I wore a niqab outside, just
to see what it’s like, just to see how people 
look at me. And I know from my own per-
sonal experience that this just happens for 
attention, just to test whether it’s true that
people look at you a certain way.”
 
njus Need for justice: a sensitivity to 
any type of perceived injustice – 
including towards the entire in-
group, or other groups – paired 




soc_pos Positive social influences: existing 
positive relationships with attach-
ment figures (for example parents),
partners, other people in the indi-
vidual’s social environment, or 
changes in the direction of positive
development (for example, termin-
ating harmful relationships, devel-
oping positive new relationships).
56 1.1: “I could always talk to my mother on 
an emotional level, my dad is kind of quiet,
so we didn’t talk to him like that very of-
ten. But, for example, I could always ask 
him any question. And then I thought, I 
was really lucky to have been brought up 
like this and to have had parents like this 
(…)”
  critdiff Critical / differentiating thinking: 
questioning information, consult-
ing multiple sources, thinking for 
oneself and reaching one’s own 
conclusions as opposed to simply 
believing what one is told, recog-
nizing differences between situ-
ations, circumstances, people, etc. 
48 1.1: “And there were some really terrifying 
videos as well… and I thought, something’s
wrong here, this can’t be right, because the
way they argue makes you think okay, that
sounds logical, but I thought to myself, 
something can’t be right, because… if this 
really were Islam, and my parents are so 
religious, why would they not be doing 
this, they’d be the first ones to go there [to
Syria to join ISIS], something’s wrong here,
why hasn’t it always been like this, why 
aren’t all Muslims like this, that’s what I 
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acc Experiences of acceptance: oppos-
ite of experiences of discrimination
and exclusion, positive experiences
of being accepted for who one is.
28 1.3: [On wearing a headscarf in public for 
the first time] “Strangely enough, neither 
at the nursery school, nor at the grocery 
store, nor anywhere else did anyone say 
anything… no one looked at me funny, as if
I was looking completely normal, and I got 
very annoyed with myself, why didn’t you 
go out like this sooner.”
 
perst Perspective taking: viewing a situ-
ation or concept from alternative 
points of view, comprehending an-
other individual’s behaviour and 
thoughts. 
25 1.3: “No Muslim has ever demanded ‘Your 
Christmas Market should be called the 
Winter Market now,’ we don’t care about 
that. (…) And I understand the Germans, I 
understand them 100 percent when they 
say ‘Why does everything’s name have to 
be changed now because of you? Why do 
we now have Day of Lights [instead of St. 
Martin’s Day] and Winter Festival [instead
of Christmas]?’ and we don’t want that. 
They can call it whatever they want.”
 
dem/leg Positive attitudes towards demo-
cracy and/or the legal order in 
general: opposite of perceiving the 
state and its authorities as illegit-
imate; a general belief that demo-
cracy is legitimate and positive, a 
trust in and reliance upon the legal
order.
11 1.1: “Islamically speaking, we have a con-
tract, so to speak, we are bound by the 
laws and we have to adhere to these laws, 
this contract. That is, from an Islamic point
of view, according to some scholars, even a 
duty, and according to most it is at least a 
principle by which we should be guided. 
And being against them [the laws] is not 
allowed in any event.”
 
T_disil Disillusionment: a feeling of disap-
pointment and dissatisfaction, 
based on the realization that 
something (for example the radical
group, its members, leaders and/or
ideology) is not what the indi-
vidual originally imagined it to be.
5 1.3: [about Pierre Vogel, a famous German 
Muslim convert and preacher]: “What I can
criticise are his quote-unquote disciples, 
they are why, for example, I don’t follow 
the Facebook page anymore. The things 
they, I think he could [try to] reprimand 
them occasionally, because of the way they
insult and attack each other, and non-
Muslims even more so. That is really bey-
ond contempt, I think.”
Ambivalent 
factors
comm Commitment: commitment to a 
cause, an ideology, a system of val-
ues or a group, the latter close to 
the concept of organizational com-
mitment.
6 1.4: [About a radical group he was tempor-
arily in contact with]: “Like I said, because 
they helped me. I was always grateful to 
them and I will always be grateful, no 
matter what they might do now, I will al-
ways be grateful for what they did.”
resp Responsibility: responsibility for 
tasks (volunteering, jobs involving 
responsibility for meaningful 
tasks, responsibility for caring for 
other people, etc.); a sense of re-
1.2 [about her younger sister]: “I only got 
to know her as a baby [the interviewee 
refers to the fact that, due to the large age 
gap, she moved out while her sister was a 
child and therefore only knew her closely 
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sponsibility for choices made. for a period of her childhood] and for me, 
she always was like my own child, and I 
took care of her a lot, I always went out-
side with her and put her to bed and so on,
I was really like a – well, I was ten years 
older.”
 
react Reactance: a motivational, adverse
reaction to anything (people, help 
being offered, ideas etc.) that ap-
pears to be limiting the indi-
vidual’s freedom of choice or 
range of alternatives.
16 1.1: “It’s become something of a cult, my 
husband also says ‘Back in the day, you’d 
have been a punk, today you’re a Salafist,’ 
you want to attract attention, you want to 
be against the system (…)”
 
vio Experiences of violence: instances 
where the individual is either the 
victim, witness or perpetrator of 
violence. 
6 1.2: [About her mother’s new boyfriend at 
the time]: “He locked me in the cellar and 
threatened me, he said things like ‘If you 
don’t shut your mouth, then…’ It was 
really sick. And my mother never believed 
me (…)”
Appendix 2
Complete List of Guiding Questions (first in English and then in German; Note: The interview was conducted
in German, hence the German version is the original; the English translation is provided for the reader’s inform-
ation.)
Intro
• General information about the profession (How long have you been working in this field? What is
your background - e.g., social work, psychology, …? Have you always worked with the same group,
i.e., right-wing extremists or Islamists, or have there been changes?).
• Everyday working life (How do clients typically come to you? Voluntarily, on referral,  from the
penal system…? Typically members of a proper radical group or people with rather loose contacts
to the scene? How many clients do you typically manage in parallel? How long do you usually work
with one client? To what extent do you involve the client's social environment? etc.).
(1) Radicalisation
• Phases  of  radicalization:  We understand “radical”  as  “ready  to  accept  violence  as  a  legitimate
means of achieving political or social goals” and radicalization as the process leading to it. What do
your clients report about this process? Have you been able to observe certain phases or stages that
appear over and over again?
• General risk factors: This refers to prolonged circumstances, conditions of the person or environ-
ment that increase the person’s vulnerability and make him or her susceptible to radical ideologies
or groups. What do clients typically report about the beginning of their radicalization process?
What risk factors have you frequently observed?
• Trigger factors: This refers to concrete events that trigger or strongly accelerate a change in the rad-
icalization process; for example: death in the family that leads to the person becoming more in-
volved with religion and ending up in an Islamist group. Do you observe such trigger factors in your
clients? Can you give examples?
• Typology of different motivations: The scientific literature discusses the idea that people can be di-
vided into types based on different psychological needs. These needs are seen as a constant that
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motivates people’s actions in the long run. The idea is that people who cannot meet these needs
through other means feel attracted to radical ideologies or groups. It is also assumed that different
types are attracted to different groups and respond to different triggers.
Do you see your clients trying to meet such needs? What needs have you frequently observed?
How do you rate the idea of a typology, as described above, based on your experience? Could you
identify types yourself?
(2) Deradicalization
• Phases of deradicalization: How do you perceive the process of deradicalization? Can you describe
the typical process, are there certain phases?
• Protective factors: Similar to the general risk factors, can you name protective factors whose devel -
opment precedes and accompanies deradicalization? How does radicalisation end? Which factors
play a role (especially in your work with clients)?
• Trigger factors: Do you observe trigger factors in your clients at the beginning or in the course of
the deradicalization process? Can you give examples?
• Typology of different motivations: Analogous to above – do you observe different types of people
who have deradicalized themselves? Can you give examples of motivations that drive deradicaliza-
tion or needs that clients wanted to meet in the course of deradicalization?
(3) Further remarks: Would you like to add anything else? Did we omit anything that you think is import -
ant?
In German (original language – this version was used in the interviews):
Einstieg
• Allgemeines zum Beruf (Wie lang sind Sie bereits in diesem Bereich tätig? Was ist Ihr Hintergrund
– z.B. Sozialarbeit, Psychologie, …? Haben Sie immer mit der selben Gruppe, d.h. Rechtsextremen
bzw. Islamisten, gearbeitet, oder gab es Wechsel?)
• Arbeitsalltag (Wie kommen die Klienten typischerweise zu Ihnen? Freiwillig, auf Verweisung hin,
aus dem Strafvollzug,…? Typischerweise Mitglieder einer festen radikalen Gruppe oder eher lose
Kontakte zur Szene? Wie viele Klienten betreuen Sie typischerweise parallel? Wie lang arbeiten Sie
üblicherweise mit einem Klienten? Inwieweit beziehen Sie das soziale Umfeld des Klienten mit ein?
etc.)
(1) Radikalisierung
• Phasen der Radikalisierung: Wir verstehen „radikal“ als „bereit, Gewalt als legitimes Mittel zur Um-
setzung politischer oder gesellschaftlicher Ziele zu akzeptieren“ und Radikalisierung als den Pro-
zess, der dazu führt. Wie berichten Ihre Klienten vom Verlauf dieses Prozesses? Konnten Sie be-
stimmte Phasen oder Stufen beobachten, die sich immer wieder zeigen?
• Generelle Risikofaktoren: Damit gemeint sind länger anhaltende Umstände, Zustände der Person
oder des Umfelds, die die Vulnerabilität der Person erhöhen und sie für radikale Ideologien oder
Gruppen empfänglich machen. Was berichten die Klienten typischerweise vom Anfang ihres Radi-
kalisierungsprozesses? Welche Risikofaktoren konnten Sie häufig beobachten?
• Trigger-Faktoren: Damit gemeint sind konkrete Ereignisse, die eine Veränderung im Radikalisie-
rungsprozess auslösen oder stark beschleunigen; Beispiel: Todesfall in der Familie, der dazu führt,
dass Person sich verstärkt mit Religion beschäftigt und so schließlich in einer islamistischen Grup-
pe landet. Beobachten Sie solche Trigger-Faktoren bei Ihren Klienten? Können Sie Beispiele nen-
nen?
• Typologie verschiedener Motivationen: In der wissenschaftlichen Literatur wird die Idee diskutiert,
dass man Personen auf Grundlage verschiedener psychologischer Bedürfnisse in Typen unterteilen
kann. Diese Bedürfnisse werden als Konstante gesehen, die langfristig die Handlungen der Perso-
nen motiviert.  Die Idee ist,  dass Personen, denen die Erfüllung dieser Bedürfnisse auf anderem
Wege nicht möglich ist, sich in dieser Situation zu radikalen Ideologien oder Gruppen hingezogen
ijcv.org
IJCV: Vol. 15/2021
Reiter, Doosje: Identity, Significance, Sensation or Justice? Diffeerent Motives which Attrract to Radical Ideas 27
fühlen. Zudem wird vermutet, dass die verschiedenen Typen sich zu unterschiedlichen Gruppen
hingezogen fühlen und auf unterschiedliche Trigger reagieren.
• Beobachten Sie bei Ihren Klienten, dass sie versuchen, solche Bedürfnisse zu erfüllen? Welche Be-
dürfnisse haben Sie häufig beobachtet? Wie schätzen Sie die Idee einer Typologie, wie oben be-
schrieben, auf Grundlage Ihrer Erfahrungen ein? Könnten Sie selbst Typen bilden?
(2) Deradikalisierung
• Phasen der Deradikalisierung: Wie nehmen Sie den Prozess der Deradikalisierung wahr? Können
Sie den typischen Verlauf beschreiben, gibt es bestimmte Phasen?
• Protektive Faktoren: Können Sie, analog zu den generellen Risikofaktoren, protektive Faktoren nen-
nen, deren Entstehung der Deradikalisierung unmittelbar vorausgeht und sie begleitet? Wie endet
Radikalisierung? Welche Faktoren spielen (insb. auch in Ihrer Arbeit mit den Klienten) eine Rolle?
• Trigger-Faktoren: Beobachten Sie Trigger-Faktoren bei Ihren Klienten am Anfang oder im Laufe des
Deradikalisierungsprozesses? Können Sie Beispiele nennen?
• Typologie verschiedener Motivationen: Analog zu oben – beobachten Sie verschiedene Typen von
Personen, die sich deradikalisiert haben? Können Sie Beispiele für Motivationen nennen, die den
Antrieb zur Deradikalisierung darstellen bzw. für Bedürfnisse, die Klienten im Zuge der Deradikali-
sierung erfüllen wollten?
(3) Weitere Anmerkungen: Möchten Sie noch etwas hinzufügen? Kam etwas nicht vor, das Sie für wich -
tig halten?
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